This paper provides evidence on growth and income poverty in Latin American and the Caribbean. Results are obtained by processing microdata from household surveys of 18 LAC countries covering the 1990s and early 2000s. Over this period the LAC economies have experienced very heterogeneous patterns of growth and poverty changes. Most countries in the region have had a rather meager performance in terms of poverty reduction. Episodes of positive, significant and unambiguously pro-poor income growth have been rare in Latin America in the last 15 years.
Introduction
The performance of an economy is usually evaluated in terms of mean variables, like per capita GDP or disposable income. If per capita GDP increases -i.e. if "the economy grows"-then the performance of the economy is assessed to be positive. Although certainly relevant, this assessment is incomplete. A given increase in mean income can be the result of different combinations of individual income changes. These combinations leading to the same change in the mean are not indifferent from a welfare point of view, except if value judgments are utilitarist. An extreme case is that arising from Rawlsian value judgments: economic growth is welfare enhancing if and only if it increases the income of the most disadvantaged people in society. In fact, this proposition underlies poverty analysis, where attention is given to the performance of the poor, and the recent debate and literature on growth and poverty. Although there remains controversies on some issues, it seems that the international community has reached a consensus on the need for evaluating an economy not only in terms of mean income growth, but also in terms of the distribution of that growth, and in particular on the income changes of the poor.
The concern for pro-poor growth is in part the consequence of evidence showing that in some countries the fruits of economic growth were not equally shared by all the population, and, more worrisome, evidence that in some growth episodes the well-being of the poor actually decreased. The issue is equally relevant when an economy experiences negative growth. Are recessions particularly harsh for the poor? How do the different socioeconomic groups fare when the economy faces a crisis?
The empirical literature on growth and poverty has flourished since the late 1990s. Based on household survey data, several contributions have tried to elucidate whether economic growth tend to "lift all boats", in particular those of the poor.
1 This paper provides evidence on this issue for a large sample of Latin American and Caribbean countries. Most of the results are obtained by processing microdata from household surveys of 18 LAC countries covering the 1990s and early 2000s.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we briefly introduce the dataset and the main methodological issues involved in measuring growth and poverty. Section 3 starts with a basic question: have Latin American and the Caribbean countries grown in the last 15 years? In section 4 we study the distribution of growth rates across income strata by examining growth-incidence curves. Section 5 restricts the analysis to the lower tail of the income distribution. We compute measures of income poverty, and analyze whether growth has been associated to a reduction in the proportion of poor people in the population. Section 6 focuses not on the number of poor people, but on their incomes: has growth been associated to an increase in the incomes of the poor? We also study whether income growth has been higher or lower in poor strata compared to the rest of the population. The links between poverty, growth and inequality in the recent experiences of Latin American and Caribbean economies is examined in section 7 by means of decompositions. We also look ahead by illustrating different configurations of neutral growth rates and redistributive policies needed to achieve certain poverty reduction targets. Section 8 closes with some concluding remarks.
The data
Most of the statistics in this chapter are obtained by processing microdata from household surveys, and are part of the Socioeconomic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean (SEDLAC), jointly developed by CEDLAS at the Universidad Nacional de La Plata and the World Bank's LAC poverty group (LCSPP). The SEDLAC contains information on more than 100 household surveys in 21 LAC countries. In this chapter we restrict the sample to 57 household surveys carried out in 18 LAC countries during the 1990s and early 2000s (see Table 2 .1). The sample includes data for Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela.
Household surveys are not uniform across LAC countries. The issue of comparability is of a great concern. We have made all possible efforts to make statistics comparable across countries and over time by using similar definitions of variables in each country/year, and by applying consistent methods of processing the data. However, perfect comparability is far from being assured. A trade-off between accuracy and coverage arises. The particular solution adopted contains an unavoidable degree of arbitrariness. We tried to be ambitious enough to include all countries in the analysis, and accurate enough so not to push the comparisons too much.
Growth: evidence on the mean
The region has had a positive but modest performance in terms of per capita GDP growth in the last one and a half decade. The unweighted average annual growth rate in the period 1990-2004 was 1.3% when GDP is measured in real local currency units (LCU), and 1.4% when GDP is measured in PPP US dollars (adjusted by the implicit price deflator of GDP in the United States). Most countries in the region managed to grow. However, per capita GDP growth rates were rather modest: only a few countries grew at more than 3% per year. Around half of the countries in the region had disappointing rates of less than 1%.
Growth was not uniform across regions and over time (see Table 3 .1). After a bad performance during the 1980s ("the lost decade" in terms of growth), the LAC economies grew on average at an annual 1.8% in the early 1990s. Growth speed up in the mid 1990s fueled by favorable external conditions and market-oriented reforms: the mean growth rate was 2.1% in the period 1993-1997. Several South American economies had difficulties in the late 1990s, which dragged the LAC mean growth rate down to 1.5%, despite a positive performance in Central America and the Caribbean. The region suffered a period of slow growth and recessions in the early 2000s, with deep crisis in some countries. The mean growth rate was a negligible 0.1% in the period 2000-2004. Since around 2003 most countries have overcome the crisis and started to grow again at relatively high rates.
While South America grew only in the first half of the 1990s (although at high rates), Central America grew throughout the 1990s, and on average the Caribbean has grown during the whole period under analysis. Table 3 .2 shows the annual growth rates for the countries included in this study. The unweighted average growth rate in the sample is 1.5% when measured in real LCU. In most cases the growth rates were meager, while two of them, Paraguay and Venezuela, suffered negative growth over the period.
Unfortunately, our micro survey data analysis does not cover exactly the period 1990-2004 in each country. That mismatch is driven mainly by the unavailability of reasonably comparable household surveys in both years. The second panel in Table 3 .2 shows the annual per capita GDP growth rates for the periods to be analyzed with the available household surveys in each country. On average the growth rates are somewhat smaller, mainly because for some countries our sample starts in the late 1990s.
Column (vi) in Table 3 .2 reports the annual growth rates in household per capita income recorded by national household surveys for the countries/years in our sample.
2 Growth in that variable does not coincide with per capita GDP growth from National Accounts. Of course, these are two different concepts and there are many reasons why they may differ in practice. The linear correlation coefficient between growth rates in household surveys and in per capita GDP is positive and significant. However, some of the differences seem very large. In five countries the sign of the growth rates are different. Since poverty figures are drawn from household surveys, recorded poverty trends may be different from what is expected from looking at per capita GDP figures. Given that, should we adjust incomes in household surveys to match national accounts? There are good arguments to avoid the adjusting, at least until differences in national accounts and household surveys are wellunderstood (Deaton, 2005) . A careful study of the reasons behind the differences, and the biases arising from using alternative data sources would be extremely helpful, but it is beyond the scope of this paper.
Growth: evidence on its distribution
These curves introduced by Ravallion and Chen (2003) are simple and illustrative instruments to analyze growth rates along the income distribution. Specifically, they show the proportional income change at each percentile of the income distribution. They are frequently used to study the extent to which different segments of the population participate in the growth process (or suffer from a recession). The interpretation of such a simple instrument, however, should be made with cautious. There are multiple factors that affect income changes, and all are reflected at the same time in a growth-incidence curve. Some of them may have nothing to do with the "growth process", and some may have complex interactions. Figures 4.1 show the growth-incidence curves for all the countries in our sample.
3 These curves are known to be very volatile at the extremes, especially in the bottom percentiles. For this reason we have computed confidence intervals, and deleted from the figures those points where estimates seem unreliable. 4 A disappointing result should be noticed from the outset: almost none of the LAC countries experienced sustainable strong growth along with significant equalizing distributional changes. In fact, Nicaragua is the only country where the growth-incidence curve lies above the horizontal axis and is decreasing on income, that is, economic changes have benefited all the population, and particularly the poor.
2 In Chile incomes from household survey are adjusted to match some National Accounts figures. Unfortunately, for this study we could not completely undo these adjustments to make Chile comparable to the rest of the countries. Pizzolitto (2005) reports that growth and poverty patterns are robust to these adjustments. 3 Growth-incidence curves for the income/consumption variable used for the estimation of poverty with national lines are available from the authors upon request. 4 Growth-incidence curves with confidence intervals are available upon request.
The figures illustrate the heterogeneous growth patterns experienced by the LAC countries over the last 15 years. For instance, while Chile has experienced sustainable growth along the income distribution, in Argentina income changes have been negative and clearly unequalizing. Although to a lesser extent, that was also the pattern for Uruguay. In contrast, between 1990 and 2002 incomes in Brazil have increased a bit, in particular in the first half of the 1990s. The growth-incidence curve of Figure 4 .1 suggests mild equalizing income changes in that country.
Figures 4.1 reflect the great variety of growth experiences in the region. It is possible to classify them into three groups:
1. A group of countries experienced positive income growth for all the population, including the poor: some Central American economies -Costa Rica, El Salvador, Nicaragua-, Chile, urban Bolivia, Brazil and Jamaica belong to this group. 2. In some economies all the population suffered income losses, especially the poor. That was the case in Argentina, Uruguay and Venezuela since the early 1990s. Bolivia, Dominican Republic and Paraguay also experienced generalized income falls since the late 1990s. 3. Mean household income did not significantly change in several countries of the region.
In the absence of growth, the fate of the poor are closely associated to distributional movements. The poorest 20% of the population seemed to have gained in Peru (97-02). That also happened for the poorest 40% in Panama (95-02). In contrast, the poorest 20% lost in Ecuador (94-98) and Mexico (92-02), while the poorest 50% suffered income reductions in urban Colombia (92-04).
Growth and poverty I: the proportion of poor people
As an economy grows incomes go up, and then it is expected that some people are able to jump out of poverty. The relationship between economic growth and income poverty is, however, a subject of much debate. Is there really a negative correlation between these two phenomena? Even if there is, is the correlation strong? Are there many exceptions to the growth-poverty-reduction story? We start this section by showing poverty statistics, and then link them to the growth figures.
Poverty measurement
We restrict the analysis to income poverty. Poverty is defined as the inability of achieving a certain minimum income level, known as the poverty line (PL). Since there is a fundamental arbitrariness in defining poverty, different authors and agencies use different poverty lines. There is a wide range of poverty estimates across studies for each country. In this paper we compute a set of poverty estimates based on international poverty lines (USD 1 a day and USD 2 a day at PPP) and national poverty lines (extreme and moderate). Using a range of lines is especially relevant given the arbitrariness in the definition mentioned above.
Both approaches on poverty (international and national) are useful. While the measurement of poverty with national lines takes into consideration that societies differ in the criteria used to identify the poor, the international lines are unavoidable instruments to compare absolute poverty levels and trends across countries, and provide regional and world poverty counts.
Poverty changes
Has poverty fallen in LAC countries during the last 15 years? The estimates in Table 5 .1 suggest a remarkable heterogeneity. While some countries achieved significant poverty reductions (e.g. Brazil, Chile, El Salvador, Jamaica, Nicaragua), some others experienced large increases in the incidence of poverty (e.g. Argentina and Venezuela). On average, the Latin American performance in terms of poverty reduction over the last 15 years has been rather disappointing (see table 5 .2). The population-weighted mean of the poverty headcount ratio has dropped 1.2 points when using the USD2-a-day line. The falls in the unweighted means have been larger, but still meager: just less than 2 points. Poverty moderately fell over the 1990s and increased in the early 2000s. As the population has been growing, and the incidence of poverty did not significantly decay, the number of poor people in the region has increased. While in the early 1990s around 106 millions Latin-Americans lived with less then USD2 a day, that number grew to 124 millions in the early 2000s.
The recent recovery of the LAC economies is helping reducing poverty in most countries, but even in that scenario the overall assessment of the last two decades would not be positive. There are substantial differences across regions in poverty reduction. The unweighted poverty mean clearly went down in Central America. In contrast, the performance in South America has been very weak, while poverty levels went up in the Andean community. The population-weighted results are somewhat different. As poverty decreased in the mostpopulated country of the region, Brazil, the poverty weighted-mean in the Mercosur went significantly down. In contrast, as poverty in Mexico stayed unchanged, the poverty record in Central America appears less impressive when taking weighted means.
A few countries have made continuous progress in terms of poverty reduction since the early 1990s. That seems to be the case of some Central American countries: El Salvador, Nicaragua, Guatemala, and probably Jamaica and Panama. Instead, the majority of LAC countries made some significant progress in the early and mid 1990s but could not sustain that pattern since then. In some few cases they managed to keep poverty roughly unchanged since the mid 1990s (Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, and Bolivia according to some estimates), but in most of them poverty went substantially up (Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Paraguay and Uruguay). Honduras and Peru have not enjoyed any episode of consistent poverty reduction, while Argentina and Venezuela have experienced large poverty increases throughout the last decade and a half.
Growth and poverty
It is said that growth is a fundamental ingredient in the recipe for poverty reduction. In this section we examine whether growth in the mean income is in fact associated to a reduction in the proportion of people below the poverty line, and how strong this link seems to be.
The first panel in Figure 5 .3 suggests a strong relationship between per capita GDP and poverty levels. The linear correlation coefficient is high (0.84): countries that have grown in the past are those with the lower proportion of poor people. As expected, poor countries, in the sense of low per capita GDP, are also countries with a large proportion of poor people. The position of the country in the poverty ladder (according to our estimates) is very similar to the position in the GDP ranking. Naturally, the association poverty -mean per capita income from household surveys is even stronger (see second panel of Figure 5 .3). The linear correlation coefficient is 0.93.
The strong empirical relationship shown above could be the result of a tight association between economic development and poverty reduction that occurred in the past, but that no longer exists. In fact, some people argue that the new growth patterns in the globalization era are leaving the poor behind, and that aggregate economic growth is no longer closely linked to poverty reduction. Figure 5 .4, however, suggests that there has been a significant relationship between economic growth (in National Accounts) and poverty reduction. 8 Notice, however, that those economies that have been stagnant or growing at very low rates (in terms of per capita GDP) have experienced poverty increases: the linear regression line lies above the origin. On average only economies that have grown at more than annual 1% have been able to reduce poverty. The relationship growth-poverty reduction is stronger when considering the annual growth rates in incomes from household surveys: the correlation coefficient is 0.87 in both panels of Figure 5 .5.
On average those countries with growth rates higher than annual 1% achieved significant poverty reductions, while those with meager or negative growth suffered poverty increases. In those countries where poverty (measured with the USD2 line) fell more than ½ point per year, the annual growth rate was 1.7% in per capita GDP and 2.8% in per capita income from surveys, while in those countries where poverty increased, the average growth rate was around zero in per capita GDP, and substantially negative in income from household surveys (-2.3%).
The evidence suggests that there exists a close relationship between aggregate economic growth and poverty reduction, in the sense of a decrease in the proportion of people below a poverty line. However, it is important to stress that these simple correlations do not prove any causal relationship. That economic growth is empirically associated to a reduction in poverty does not mean that anything that makes mean income go up will make poverty go down. It also say nothing about the need for policy interventions and the appropriate policy instruments. However, the correlations shown suggest the relevant role that growth should have in any poverty-reduction strategy.
Poverty-growth elasticities
How strong is the link between growth and poverty reduction? Even if the relationship between these variables is statistically significant, it could be the case that fast growth is associated to a small poverty drop. Table 5 .3 reports the annual proportional change in poverty and the income growth rate in each period, and the resulting poverty-growth elasticities. Although sometimes illustrative, these elasticities are highly sensitive to the specific location of the poverty line in the income distribution, and to the growth rate. In one extreme if the growth rate is zero, any change in poverty would imply infinite povertygrowth elasticity. For this reason in Table 5 .3 we delete the elasticities when the growth rate is less than 1%.
In most countries episodes of economic growth are associated to growing disposable income and falling poverty, implying negative poverty-growth elasticities. The magnitude of these elasticities varies as we consider incomes from surveys or GDP from national accounts, and alternative poverty lines. On average, the elasticity is around -1.4 when considering international poverty lines and income growth from household surveys, and -1.7 when using GDP growth from national accounts. The results obtained from a crosscountry regression are similar (Table 5 .4). The results are just illustrative since we have only 30 observations. The estimated poverty-growth elasticities are around -1.6. The interactions of the growth rate with the distance between the poverty line and the mode of the income distribution, and with the change in the Gini coefficient do not appear to be statistically significant.
In summary, there is some evidence that in the past 15 years in Latin America on average a 10 percentage point increase in economic growth (measured by either survey mean income or per capita GDP) have been associated to a fall of more than 10% but less than 20% in the proportion of poor people in the population.
Growth and poverty II: the real and relative incomes of the poor
Frequently, the discussion about growth and poverty deals not with the change in the number of poor people, but with the income changes experienced by the poor. In this section we start by examining changes in real incomes of the poor population, and then turn to relative incomes.
The real incomes of the poor
According to one well-know definition growth is said to be "pro-poor" if and only if poor people benefit in real terms (Ravallion and Chen, 2003; Ravallion, 2004) . The growthincidence curves computed in section 4 are useful instruments to assess changes in the real incomes of the poor. The fact that the curve is above the zero axis at all points up to the headcount ratio H means that real income has increased for all the poor population.
9
Define α to be a weighted sum of the individual income growth rates g i, i.e. α=∑ i σ i g i , where σ i are the weights, which are non-increasing in individual income x i. In a typical poverty analysis the social weights of the non-poor are zero, i.e. σ i =0 if x i ≥z, where z is the poverty line. In this context growth is said to be pro-poor if α>0. In particular, if σ i is the same for all the poor people an equal to 1/NH, where N stands for total population, then α is just the average of the growth rates of the poor. Ravallion and Chen (2003) argue for the use of this average as a measure of pro-poor growth. They show that this indicator is equal to the change in the Watts poverty index per unit time divided by the headcount index.
The Ravallion and Chen's measure of pro-poor growth is computed in Table 6 .1 for all the countries in our sample. In most cases we present the results for four alternatives poverty lines. In columns (iii) and (iv) we compute the mean growth rate of household per capita income for those below the USD1 and USD2 lines, respectively. In columns (v) and (vi) we compute the mean growth rate in the income (or consumption) variable used for poverty estimates with the national lines, for those below the extreme and moderate lines. In all cases we compute growth rates for those percentiles below H in the initial period.
The table reads as follows. Between 1992 and 2004 mean income in the Argentina's Encuesta Permanente de Hogares decreased at an annual 2.9%. The fall in per capita income for the poor was much harsher: around an annual 7.9% for the USD 2 a day definition. Real incomes for the most disadvantaged fraction of the Argentine population have decreased at a fast rate.
Pro-poor growth rates have been positive in urban Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Jamaica, Panama, and Nicaragua and negative in Argentina, Colombia, Mexico, Uruguay and Venezuela. Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Honduras and Paraguay also experienced negative pro-poor growth rates since mid 1990s.
The relative incomes of the poor
It is argued that the concept of "pro-poor growth" should make reference to situations where growth is associated to a proportionally larger income increase for the poor than for the rest of the population. According to this view growth is "pro-poor" if poverty falls more than it would have if all incomes had grown at the same rate (Baulch and McCullock (2000), Kakwani and Pernia (2000) ; Kakwani et al. (2003) , Son (2004) ).
Perhaps surprisingly, the term progressivity, extensively used in tax and benefit-incidence analysis, has been rarely used in this literature. A social program is said to be progressive if the benefits as a share of income are a decreasing function of income. In the same way, growth can be defined as progressive if the change in income as a share of initial income (i.e. the growth rate) is a decreasing function of income. Define β as a weighted sum of the difference between the individual income growth rate g i and the growth rate of the mean g µ ., i.e. β=∑ i σ i (g i -g µ ). Growth is said to be progressive if β>0. In the case where σ i =0 if x i ≥z, and σ i =1/NH if x i <z, then β is just the difference between the average of the growth rates of the poor and the growth rate of the mean. Table 6 .2 computes this measure of progressive growth for four alternative poverty estimates. The experiences have been heterogeneous across countries. Only four countries have significant progressive growth rates. In the case of Dominican Republic and Paraguay that reflects the fact that the poor suffered less (in terms of income changes) than the non-poor in the recent economic contractions. In Panama and despite a stagnant mean income, the incomes of the poor have increased. Finally, Nicaragua is the only country that exhibits growth rates that are significant, positive and progressive. 10 Only that country is well into the area of economies with positive and progressive growth rates. Argentina stands out in the "negative" area of economies with regressive negative growth.
In summary, episodes where income growth was positive, significant and unambiguously pro-poor (in absolute and relative terms) have been rare in Latin America in the last 15 years. In contrast, the region has some cases of significant negative growth that strongly hit the poor: Argentina and Venezuela for the last decade, and several countries since the late 1990s fit into this category.
Poverty, growth and inequality: assessing the past and looking to the future
Driven by a multiplicity of factors individual real incomes change in a given period. These changes usually modify different dimensions of the income distribution, like the mean, the degree of dispersion, and the mass below certain cut-off points. In this sense growth, (associated to the change in the mean of the income distribution), changes in inequality (associated to changes in the income dispersion), and changes in poverty (associated to changes in the lower tail of the distribution) are all particular manifestations of the change in the whole income distribution. Growth, inequality and poverty are "endogenous variables", and then it is not valid, for instance, to think changes in poverty as caused by growth and changes in inequality.
Being said that, researchers have found useful to decompose the change in the whole income distribution into two steps: changes in its central position (growth) and changes in its dispersion (inequality). Each of these steps in turn implies changes in the lower tail of the distribution (poverty). In that analysis, then, changes in poverty are presented as the result of growth and changes in inequality. Growth rates were analyzed in the previous sections. In this section we first take a look at inequality changes and then discuss the decomposition of poverty changes into growth and redistribution effects.
Inequality changes
The measurement of inequality faces many conceptual and practical issues that are treated in a vast literature. 11 In Table 7 .1 we show some of the most widespread inequality indicators computed over the distribution of household per capita income.
12 Although the inequality ranking of countries varies as we consider different indices, the linear correlations among indices are high. Argentina, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Uruguay and Venezuela consistently rank as the most equal economies in the region, while Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Panama and Paraguay occupy the last positions in the inequality ladder.
The assessment of the changes in inequality become more dependent on the index used. 13 The correlations are still positive and significant but smaller in size. Argentina and Colombia stand out as the countries that experienced the largest increases in inequality. Bolivia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Uruguay and Venezuela have also witnessed unequalizing distributional changes.
Inequality changes do not seem to be associated to growth patterns. The linear correlations between changes in a given inequality index and income growth rates are always non-significant, regardless of the inequality index and the income variable (either from surveys or National Accounts). For instance, the correlation between the changes in the Gini for the distribution of household per capita income, and growth rates in that variable is just -0.02.
Exploring the changes in poverty
As said above, changes in poverty can be statistically decomposed into a growth and a redistribution effect. In particular, we simulate the poverty change that would have occurred in a given period, had the mean income changed, but the shape of the distribution stayed fixed. In this simulation poverty changes as the "result" of changes in mean income, while inequality remains unchanged. This is the growth effect on poverty changes. The redistribution effect records the change in poverty that would have occurred if the shape of the distribution had changed in the way it did, but the mean had remained fixed.
14 Table 7 .2 shows the results of decomposing poverty changes for each country in our dataset. Poverty as measured by the USD2 line increased 11.9 points in Argentina between 1992 and 2004. If all incomes had changed (decreased in the Argentine case) at the same rate as the mean did, then the poverty headcount ratio would have increased 4.3 points. The remaining 7.6 points poverty increase was driven by changes in the shape of the income distribution, which in the Argentine case were unequalizing. Notice that while the redistribution effect accounts for most of the poverty change when using the international and the national extreme lines, the growth effect becomes prominent when using the national moderate poverty line. This observation is mainly driven by the fact that the national moderate poverty line is close to the mode of the income distribution in Argentina.
Most of the successful stories of poverty reduction (using the USD 2 line) were driven by generalized growth: Bolivia (92-03), Chile (90-03), Costa Rica (92-03), El Salvador (91-03), Jamaica (90-02), and Nicaragua (93-01). Only in Brazil (90-03) and Panama (95-02) the redistribution effect was larger than the growth effect. Brazil and El Salvador are the only cases for which both the growth and the redistribution effect were significantly poverty-reducing for all poverty lines.
Unequalizing distributional changes are behind the increase in poverty in Argentina (92-04), Colombia (92-00), and Ecuador (94-98). In contrast, the raise in poverty is mainly or totally associated to a generalized income drop in Dominican Republic (00-04), Paraguay (97-02), Uruguay (89-03) and Venezuela (89-00). Argentina is the only country for which both the growth and the redistribution effect were significantly poverty-increasing for all poverty lines considered.
Looking to the future: isopoverty curves
The reduction of poverty is one of the main goals of national societies and international organizations. The roads leading to that goal are subject of great debate. In this section we simplify the issue by thinking poverty reduction as the result of either neutral per capita income growth, or redistributive policies, or a combination of both. Of course reality is much more complex: there might be no policy instrument that increase productivity proportionally for all the population, while redistributive policies may take a significant toll on efficiency, and hence on incomes. However, it is still illustrative to know what is the effort in terms of neutral economic growth and simple non-distortionary redistributive policies to attain a certain poverty target. This information is useful at least to have an idea of the "distance" of the country from the poverty target in terms of growth and redistribution.
Specifically, in this section we compute isopoverty curves, that is, combinations of neutral growth rates and simple redistributive policies that are capable of attaining a given poverty objective. 15 The starting point in each country is the latest income distribution available. We model growth by multiplying household income by a constant, thus assuming neutral growth. This exercise tell us at what rate the economy should grow, with unchanged Lorenz curve, to meet a given poverty target.
We also model two alternative distributive policies. In the first one we tax all income at the same rate and allocate the revenues in equal amounts per capita. 16 It can be shown that the fall in the Gini coefficient after this exercise is similar to the tax rate t. This simple redistributive policy, although not targeted to the poor, is not far from the actual fiscal system of several countries, where taxes are approximately proportional and public expenditures per capita do not substantially vary with income.
The second redistributive policy minimizes the fiscal cost of a given poverty reduction, as measured by the headcount ratio. In addition, uniform taxes (at a rate t) are only paid by the non-poor. This second policy is a lower bound in terms of fiscal cost of reducing the headcount ratio, since only the poor who are closer to the poverty line receive the transfer (i.e. those that need a smaller transfer to escape out of poverty), and they receive only the minimum amount needed to reach the poverty line. Although this policy would be probably undesirable (as the very poorest do not receive transfers), and difficult to implement (as it is perfectly targeted, with transfers depending on income), it is theoretically interesting as a lower bound for the fiscal effort to meet the poverty goal. 17 In both redistributive policies we assume no efficiency costs (or gains).
For each LAC country in our sample we compute isopoverty curves using four alternative poverty lines (figure 7.2). In each case we estimate three curves, corresponding to the goals of reducing poverty 25%, 50% and 75% from current levels in ten years. For instance, based on the 2003 figures Costa Rica will have to grow at an annual rate of more than 2% for the next decade to reduce poverty in 25%, assuming no changes in inequality. The corresponding growth rates for the target of reducing poverty in 50% are between 4.9% and 8.7%, depending on the poverty line chosen. Halving poverty through a simple redistributive linear policy demands an incremental rate of 5.1% if poverty is measured as USD1 a day, a rate of 8.5% if poverty is measured as USD 2 day or with the extreme national line, and of 17% if moderate poverty wants to be halved. Obviously, the possibility of combining the two policies reduces the growth and tax rates needed to reach a given poverty target. However, notice that the values involved are still significant. If Costa Rica grows at an annual 3% for the next decade with no distributional changes, it will still need to implement a redistributive policy with a 3.4% incremental tax rate to be able to halve poverty, as measured with the USD 2 line. If Costa Rica were able to implement a perfectly targeted system of transfers, the fiscal effort to halve poverty would be small (incremental rate of around 0.2%).
15 See Gasparini and Cicowiez (2005) for specific details on the computation of these curves. 16 See Paes de Barros (2003) and Ferreira and Leite (2003) . 17 The transfers that maximize the poverty impact have a particular feature: they do not reach the very poorest. This bothering feature is driven by the use of the headcount ratio as poverty index.
The impact of a neutral growth rate on the proportional change in poverty depends on the shape of the income distribution below the poverty line. If the proportion of people "close" to the line is large compared to the all the people below the line, then neutral growth will take a large proportion of people out of poverty. While 20% of the Uruguayans below the USD 2 poverty line have incomes that are just less than 10% lower than the line, the corresponding proportion in Paraguay is 7%. The first panel in Figure 7 .3 shows that Uruguay would need to growth at much smaller rates than Paraguay to halve poverty in 10 years. The linear correlation (across countries) between the fraction of the poor people who are close to the line and the size of the growth effect is negative and large (-0.85).
The size of the redistribution policy needed to achieve a given poverty-reduction target is larger for the poorest countries (in terms of mean income from household surveys at USD PPP). Poorer countries have lower mean income -and hence lower revenues from a given tax rate -, and higher poverty -and hence need a greater effort to halve poverty. The second panel in Figure 7 .3 ranks the countries in our dataset by the incremental tax rate needed to halve poverty in 10 years with no growth. The linear correlation coefficient between this rate and mean income at USD PPP is negative and large (-0.90). Figure 7 .4 illustrates the incremental tax rate needed to halve poverty if the economies managed to grow at a neutral annual 3% rate for 10 years. The size of the redistribution involved are in many cases large.
Concluding remarks
In this paper we have provided evidence on the association between growth and poverty reduction in Latin America and the Caribbean. Results are obtained by processing microdata from household surveys of 18 LAC countries covering the 1990s and early 2000s. We choose to highlight just some few general results in this final section.
The evidence in LAC suggests a strong correlation between economic growth and income poverty reduction. Although this simple correlation does not prove any causal relationship, it suggest the relevant role that growth should have in any poverty-reduction strategy.
On average, poverty has just slightly fallen in Latin America and the Caribbean since the early 1990s. This frustrating pattern is associated to slow growth (especially when measured with household survey data) and increase in inequality. Almost none of the LAC countries experienced sustainable strong growth along with significant equalizing distributional changes in the last decade and a half.
The LAC average is not a good representation of the country performances. The evidence suggests a remarkable heterogeneity of growth and poverty reduction patterns. Poverty has been consistently reduced in urban Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Source: Own calculations based on household surveys. Note: Year t1 refers to the first year in column (i) Year t2 refers to the last year in column (i) Source: Own calculations based on household surveys. Note: "national" income means the income/consumption variable used to compute poverty with national lines. Source: Own calculations based on household surveys. Note: "national" income means the income/consumption variable used to compute poverty with national lines. , 1989 Argentina, 1992 Paraguay, 1997 -2002 Chile, 1990 Brazil, 1990 Colombia and Venezuela -2002 Ecuador, 1994 -1998 Bolivia (urban), 1993 -2002 Peru, 1997 -2002 Costa Rica, El Salvador and Nicaragua 
